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ABSTRACT 
A model of plea bargaining with asymmetric information is presented. The prosecutor's 
private information consists of the strength of the case, while the defendant's private information is 
his or her own guilt or innocence. A sequential equilibrium is computed, in which a fraction of cases 
are dismissed because they are too likely to involve an innocent defendant; in the remaining cases, 
the prosecutor's offer of a sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty signals the strength of the case. I 
then ask whether the prosecutor (and society) might be better off if constrained to make the same 
offer to all defendants, regardless of the strength of the case. It is shown that, depending upon other 
features of the criminal justice system and upon the preferences of society, either of these regimes 
may be preferred to the other. In particular, it is possible that unlimited discretion is 
disadvantageous for the prosecution (since it carries with it the requirement of sequential rationality). 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Plea bargaining is a prominent feature of the criminal justice system. According to Alschuler 
(1981, p. 652), "it is commonly estimated that 90% of all criminal convictions are the result of guilty 
pleas." Moreover, a large fraction of cases are simply dismissed; based upon a sample of 1,382 
felony arrests in New York City in 1971, the Vera Institute of Justice (1977, p. 7) estimates that 
"Forty-three percent of the felony arrests were disposed of by dismissal." 
Under current practice, prosecutors have essentially unlimited discretion to dismiss a case, 
or to negotiate a guilty plea to a lesser crime, thereby guaranteeing a lighter sentence. Much 
controversy surrounds the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. While it is acknowledged that guilty 
pleas save resources which would otherwise be devoted to trials, one major concern of opponents to 
plea bargaining is that the prosecutor is in an unfairly strong bargaining position. "The most 
common and most powerful market-failure argument is that plea bargains are not voluntary sales by 
defendants of their rights but are instead coerced responses to threats by prosecutors and judges" 
(Easterbrook, 1983, p. 3ll). One source of bargaining strength for the prosecutor is simply the fact 
that the defendant is required to deal with him or her, and cannot "shop " for a better deal. 
Another asymmetry between the bargaining positions of the prosecutor and the defendant 
stems from the fact that the prosecutor typically has better information about the strength of the case 
than does the defendant. The prosecution has presumably interviewed witnesses (including the 
defendant) and gathered evidence (which might or might not subsequently be found admissible). In 
the modal criminal case, the time and investigative resources available to the defense are a fraction 
of those available to the prosecution. Thus although in principle the defense may have equal access 
to evidence and witnesses, 1 in practice they rely on summary data from the prosecution. It seems 
likely that in this case there will remain some uncertainty on the part of the defense regarding the 
strength of the prosecution's case. 
In this paper, a model of the plea bargaining process in the presence of asymmetric 
information is developed. 2 While the issue of the desirability of prosecutorial discretion is not 
resolved in complete generality, two regimes of varying extents of discretion are compared. In the 
first, the prosecutor has discretion to offer an arbitrary sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty, with 
a sentence of length 0 interpreted as a dismissal. In the second, plea bargaining is still permitted, but
all defendants must be offered the same sentence.3 It is shown that, depending upon other features of
the criminal justice system and upon the preferences of society, either of these regimes may be 
preferred to the other. In particular, it is possible that unlimited discretion is disadvantageous for the 
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Assumption 2. f '  (1t) > 0 for all 1t E [0,1]; that is, the better the case against the defendant, the
greater is the likelihood of guilt. 
Define E1 (1t I 8) to be the defendant of type t 's expectation of 1t, given that 7t belongs to the
set 8 � [0,1]. 
Assumption 3. Eg (1t I 8) ;?: Ei (1t I 8) for all 8; that is, the distribution of (t ,7t) is such that, given
7t E 8, a guilty defendant faces a stronger case (in expectation) than does an innocent defendant.
In the Appendix, it is shown that the distribution G (1t,i) = 11[1 - e -h;1t]/[l - e -h;] and
G ( 1t,g ) = ( 1 -11) [ 1 - e -ha 1t]I[ 1 - e -hg], with hi > hg , satisfies Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 for subsets 8 
of the form [a ,b]. 
Suppose s is the sentence offered in a plea bargain, and x is the sentence anticipated upon
conviction in court; s and x are nonnegative and represented in terms of utility. Let k denote the
disutility of trial for the defendant. A strategy for the defendant of type t is a function p =Pt (s)
specifying the probability that the defendant rejects a sentence offer of s. We can write the expected
utility to a type t defendant who is offered the sentence s and rejects it with probability p as:
DU1(s,p;8(s))=- p[Et(7t I 8(s))x +k]- (1-p)s, (1) 
where 8(s) describes the defendant's beliefs upon observing s; that is, 8(s) is the set of types 7t which
the defendant believes would offers ; note that this is not subscripted, because there is no reason for 
different defendants to have different conjectures about this set of types. However, the expectation 
is subscripted because the innocent and guilty may assign different distributions over the set 8(s) 
because (7t, t) are jointly distributed. However, if the plea bargain s reveals 7t, then the guilty and
innocent will have identical (degenerate) expectations about 1t given an offer of s. In this case, they
might as well use the same strategy p = p (s ) . 4 When the sentence offer does not reveal 7t, then the
two types of defendants will use different strategies: Pt (s ), fort = g ,i.
Assumption 4. When both defendant types are indifferent about accepting or rejecting a sentence 
offers , they use the same strategy p (s ). 
The objective function of the prosecutor is assumed to coincide with that of society at large, 
and involves three goals: appropriate punishment of the guilty, avoidance of punishment of the 
innocent and the conservation of resources spent on trials. The first two of these three goals are 
made explicit in the following excerpt from the Supreme Court opinion in Berger v. U.S. (quoted in 
Jackson, 1984, p. 143). 
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Proposition 1. A sequential equilibrium for this model is for the prosecutor to offers* = 0 (i.e., 
dismiss the case) if 7t < n0; otheiwise offer s* = 1tX + k . Let J.. = 1toX + k and s = x + k. Then the
defendant (whether guilty or innocent) rejects the offers with probability p* (s) = 1 ifs > s, with 
probability p* (s) = 1 - exp{[ A�) -A (s )]Jc } for s E [ J..,S ], and with probability p* (s) = 0 if 
s < J..  Finally, the defendants' conjectures are 3* (s) = 1 for s 2 s, 3* (s) = (s -k )Ix for 
s E [ J.. ,s ], 3* (s) = n0 for s E (0, J..), and 3* (s) = [7ta.,7to) for s = 0. 
PROOF. Given 3* (s), is p* (s) optimal? Fors > s, 3* (s) = 1 and DU1 =- p(x + k) - (1- p)s, so 
p* = 1 is optimal. Fors E [ J..,S ], 3* (s) = (s -k)lx and DU1 =- ps - (1 - p)s, so any p works. 
Thus p* (s) = 1 - exp{[A �) -A (s) ]/ c }  is optimal for s E [ J.. ,s ] . Fors E (0,J..), 3* (s) = n0 and
DU 1 = - p(1toX + k)- (1- p)s, sop* = 0 is optimal for s E (0, J..). Finally, for
s = 0, 3* (s)= [1ta.,1t0); sinceE1(1t I [1ta.,1to))21ta.,DU 1 =- p[E1(1t I [7ta,.1t0))x +k]- (1- p)s
implies that p* = 0 is optimal.
Given p* (s ), is s* (n) optimal? Since p* (s) is the same for both defendant types, we can 
use the prosecutor's payoff as described in equation (3). For n < n0, PU (n,s ;p* (s )) < 0 for all
positive values of s while PU (n,O;p* (0)) = 0, so s* (1t) = 0 is optimal for 1t < n0• For 1t 2 n0,
PU (n,s;p* (s)) >PU (n,s ;p* (s)) for s >sand PU(n,J..;p* �))>PU (n,s ;p* (s )) for s <;£. So 
s* (n) E [ J..,S] for 1t 2 n0. Differentiating PU (n,s ;p* (s )) with respect to s and equating to zero
yields 
dPU I ds = exp{[A �)-A (s )]/c }{[A '(s )Jc ] [-c +a (n)(Jt.X + k - s )] +a (n)} = 0. 
Upon noting that exp{·}is never zero, and that A '(s) =a ((s -k)lx), this simplifies to 
a (n)(Jt.X +k - s)=c [a((s -k)lx)-a(n)]. 
Since a O is an increasing function, whenever the left-hand side is positive, the right-hand 
side is negative, and vice versa. Thus the only solution is s = JtX + k. That is, the function 
PU (n,s ;p* (s )) has a unique stationary point at s* = nx + k. Moreover, the second derivative of 
PU (n,s ;p* (s )) with respect to s is negative at s* . Thuss* provides a local maximum. But it is 
also a global maximum because otheiwise there would have to be an interior local minimum 
between the local maxima, but there are no other stationary points of PU (n,s ,p* (s )). 
Finally, we need to check consistency: 3* (s) � [1ta ,1] for alls. Moreover, 3* (s* (n)) = 1t 
for n E [n0,l] and 3* (0) = [1ta.,1to). which is exactly the set of cases dismissed by the prosecutor (i.e.,
offered s* = 0). 
Notice that the equilibrium consists of two portions. One involves complete pooling for 
prosecutor types n < n0 while the other involves complete separation for types 1t 2 n0. Under the
assumption that when the sentence offer reveals the strength of the case, both types of defendant use 
the same strategy p (s ), the uniqueness proof in Reinganum and Wilde (1986) can be adapted to show 
that the separating portion of the equilibrium is unique. If this symmetry assumption is relaxed, I 
have been unable to rule out the possibility of a separating equilibrium in which the two defendant 
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Alschuler (1981, p. 708) remarks that " ... when a prosecutor does entertain serious doubts 
concerning a defendant's factual guilty, he is likely to decline to prosecute ... " and Silberman 
(1980, p. 367) concludes that "Most prosecutors believe that they should not press charges unless 
they are convinced of the defendant's guilt." In addition, when a case is not dismissed, the likelihood 
that it will be resolved by a guilty plea is greater the weaker is the case, which is one plausible 
interpretation of Alschuler's (1968, p. 60) statement: " ... the greatest pressures to plead guilty are 
brought to bear on defendants who may be innocent. The universal rule is that the sentence 
differential between guilty-plea and trial defendants increases in direct proportion to the likelihood 
of acquittal." 
3. THE MODEL WITH RESTRICTED DISCRETION
The model of Section 2 involved considerable discretion upon the part of the prosecutor. 
Alternatively, prosecutors might be constrained to offer the same sentence to all defendants; or they 
might be constrained to go to trial in all cases. When the former interpretation is taken, then the 
prosecutor must make a "pooling " offer, and this can result in self-selection by the defendant types 
·· (because they have different expected values of 1t though they share the same support). Let E, 
Il . denote type t 's prior expectation over 1t (conditional on arrest): E1 = 1td c'P(1t I t )/ [1 - <l>(1t11 I t )] .1ta 
By Assumption 3, E8 - Ei > O; the guilty defendant expects a greater likelihood of conviction than
does the innocent defendant 
If a pooled offers is made, it is the expectation E, which governs the defendant's decision. 
The innocent defendant rejects s if and on1y ifs > s 0 = E ix + k, while the guilty defendant
rejects s if and on1y ifs > s 0 = E8 x + k. Thus any offers e (s 0, s 0] will be rejected by the innocent
and accepted by the guilty. 
Is it possible that an ex ante restriction requiring the prosecutor to make the same offer to all 
parties could improve the prosecutor's welfare? 
If an offer of s e (s 0, s °J is made, it is accepted by the guilty and rejected by the innocent;
thus the best such offer is s = s 0, which yields expected prosecutor utility of
U 1 = qys0 - (1-q)[c + A.(Eix + k)]. (5) 
Any offers > s 0 is rejected by all defendants, yielding expected prosecutor utility of
U2= -c +q'Y(E8x +k)-(1-q)A.(Eix +k). (6) 
Finally, any offers :S s 0 is accepted by all defendants, yielding expected prosecutor utility of
U 3(S) = [q"'f - (1 -q )A]S. (7) 
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Rewriting U 1 in these same terms yields
U i = f "{[1tX + k ]qd<P(1t I g )/[l -<P(1ta I g )] 
1ta 
l - f [c + A(1tX + k )](1-q )d <P(1t I i )/[l -<P(1ta I i)]. 
1ta 
Comparing the coefficients of (1 -q )d <P(1t I i)/[1 -<P(1ta I i )], we see that restricting
discretion results in a loss for each innocent defendant, since PU* (1t) 2:: 0 > - [c + A(1t.X + k )] for all
1t E [1ta,1]. However, restricting discretion results in a gain for each guilty defendant. Comparing
the coefficients of qd <P(1t I g )I[ 1 - <P(1ta I g )] above yields A[1t.X + k] >PU* (1t) = 0 for 1t < 7t0; and
PU* (1t) =a (1t)(1tX + k) - ft (1t)c, where a (1t) = f (1t)"(- [1 - f (1t)]A > 0 for 1t > 1t0. Thus
PU* (1t) < "{[1t.X + k] if and only if (a (1t) - y)(1t.X + k) - p (1t)c < 0. Since
a (1t)-y=-[1-f (1t)](y + A), this inequality holds for all Jt 2:: 1t0. Thus if the proportion of guilty
defendants (q) is sufficiently high, these gains outweigh the losses suffered on the innocent 
defendants. 
Such an ex ante restriction on discretion can enhance the payoff to society because in 
sequential equilibrium the prosecutor must behave optimally given its private information (if it has 
discretion). It may be better to be constrained to ignore this information rather than to act optimally 
upon it, because of strategic considerations (i.e., the response of the strategic defendants). 
It is also interesting to note that the defendants' preferences are the opposite of society's in 
the two cases described above. The ex ante expected utility to the defendant of type t under
discretion is EDU1 * = EDU1 (ft (1t),s* (1t);8 * (s* (1t))), or
· l 
EDU1* =-J (1tX +k)d<P(1t I t)l[I -<P(1ta I t)]. 
1to 
When s = 0 is the optimum with restricted discretion, expected utility for the type t 
defendant is EDU[= 0, so both types of defendant prefer restricted discretion. On the other hand,
whens = s0 is the optimum with restricted discretion,
EDU[=-f\1tX +k)d<P(1t I t)/[1--<l>(1ta I t)]. 
1ta 
Thus both types of defendant weakly prefer discretion, with this preference being strict if 
rc0 > 1ta. It is possible for all defendants to have one preference and society the opposite because
society's preferences depend inversely on the welfare of guilty defendants (at least up to the 
maximum penalty x + k) and directly on the welfare of innocent defendants.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The finding that an ex ante restriction upon prosecutorial discretion can be welfare­
improving suggests that arrest standards are important determinants of the institutional forms of 
related aspects of the criminal justice system. That is, low arrest standards make discretion optimal 
since bad cases (cases likely to involve innocents) must be weeded out. On the other hand, high 
arrest standards make a lack of discretion optimal since one can extract higher penalties from guilty 
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APPENDIX 
-h·'Ir. -h· -h 1r. -h Example. Let G(1t,i)= rt[l-e I ]/[1-e ']andG(1t,g)=(l-rt)[l-e g ]/[1-e 8], where
hi > hg and 1t E [0,1]. We wish to verify that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 (for o of the form [a ,b]) are
satisfied. 
Assumption 1. The fraction of guilty among those arrested is q (1ta) = [G (1,g) -G (1ta.,g )]
l[G (l,g) -G (1ta.,g) + G (1,i) -G (1ta,i)]. Then q' (1ta,) > 0 if and only if dG (1ta,,i)[G (l,g) 
-G (1ta.,g )] > dG (1ta.,g )[G (l,i) -G (1ta,i )]. For our example, this inequality is equivalent to
hi/[1-e-h;(l-1ta)] > hgl[l -e-h8(1-1ta)]. Let y(h) = h/[1-e-h(l-1ta)]; since y'(h) > 0 for
1ta E [ 0,1) and since hi > hg, it follows that q' (1ta) > 0 for all 1ta. E [0,1). 
Assumption 2. The probability of guilt conditional upon 1t is f (1t) = dG (1t,g )l[dG (1t,g) + dG (1t,i )].
Differentiating and collecting terms implies thatf' (1t) > 0 if and only if dG (1t,i)Jd2G (1t,i) 
> dG (1t,g )I d2G (1t,g ) . For our example, this inequality becomes -1/ h; > -1/ hg or h; > hg . 
Assumption 3. The conditional expectation of 1t, given the defendant's type and given that 1t E [a ,b]
is 
E1(1t I [a ,b]) = r 1td4>(1t I t)l[ct>(b I t)-ct>(a I t )]
a 
=a + r[ct>(b I t) -4>(1t I t )]l[ct>(b I t) -ct>(a I t )]d 1t. 
a 
-h 1r. -h b -h a -h b For our example, [ct>(b I t) -4>(1t I t )]/[ct>(b I t ) -ct>(a I t )] = [e 1 -e 1 ]J[e 1 -e 1 ] • 
Since w (h) = [e-h1r. -e-hb ]l[e-ha -e-hb] is non-increasing in h for 1t E [a ,b ], hi > hg implies
w(h;)::;;w(hg)for1tE [a ,b]. Thus E;(1t I [a ,b])::;;Eg(1t I [a ,b]). 
Alternative out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We claim that a sufficient condition for the equilibrium 
strategies of Proposition 1 to be robust to out-of-equilibrium beliefs is: 1t0 ::;; c !'Ax. To see this,
recall that since Eg (1t I O(s )) � Ei (1t I O(s )) for all o(s ) , if the type i defendant strictly prefers to
accepts ,  then so does the type g defendant. Thus (assuming identical behavior when both
defendant types are indifferent), only three types of asymmetric behavior can arise: (1) g accepts s 
and i rejects s; (2) g randomizes due to indifference and i rejects s; and (3) g accepts s and i 
randomizes due to indifference. 
Consider first the case of identical behavior. Fors e Ou 11,,s], 
PU (1t,s ;p (s )) = p (s )[ -c +a (1t)(1tX + k )] + (1 -p (s )]a (1t)s 
for some p (s) e [0, 1]. Note that any s >sis optimally rejected by both defendant types regardless
of their beliefs. Let PU* (1t) =PU (1t,s* (1t);p* (s* (1t))). Since PU* (1t) =a (1t)(1tX + k) -ft (1t)c 
>a (1t)(1tX + k) -c for all 1t � 1t0, no such 1t would offers > s. Similarly, PU* (1t) = 0
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Proof of Proposition 2. (a) Recall that p* (s) = 1- exp{[A �)-A (s)]le }. Note thatA O also 
depends upon the parameters k, x, y and A.: A (s; k .x ,y,A.) = J a ((s -k )Ix )d s, where
a 0 = f Oy- (1 - f O)A.. The results that p* '(s) > 0 and '()p* (s )I de < 0 are immediate. 
Differentiation of p* (s) with respect to any other parameter m yields the following formula: 
'() p* (s)l'()m =-(1/e)exp{[A�)-A (s)]lc }[A '�)(d1ldm) +'()A �)lam -aA (s)l'()m]. 
Since A'�) =a(1to) = 0, sgn'() p* (s)lam = sgn ['()A (s)lam -aA �)lam] = sgna2A (s)ICJmas 
= sgn aa ((s -k )Ix )ICJm. 
The claims of Theorem 2(a) then follow from the facts that aa ((s -k )Ix )/'()k 
=a'((s -k)lx)(-llx)<O,aa((s -k)lx)/'()x =a'((s -k)(-llx2)<0,aa((s -k)lx)!'()y 
= f ((s -k)lx) > O and aa((s -k)lx)/'()A. =-(1-f ((s -k)lx)) < 0. 
(b) Recall that s* = 1tX + k; the claimed results are immediate. 
(c) For ft (1t) = 1 - exp{[A �)-A (s* (1t))]/e }, the results that ft '(1t) > 0 and '()ft (1t)/'()e < 0 are 
immediate. Differentiating with respect to any other parameter m yields 
'()ft (1t)/'()m = - (lie )exp{[A �)-A (s* (1t))]/ e }{A '�)(d§_!dm) 
- A  '(s* )(ds* ldm) +'()A �)/'()m -'()A (s* )/am}. 
Again, A'�)= a (1to) = 0, and ds* ldm = 0 for y and A., so sgn '()ft (1t)/'()m 
= sgn '()2A (s )/'()mas = sgn aa ((s -k )Ix )/'()m form = y and A.. The results that '()ft (1t)l'() y  > 0 and 
dft (1t)/'()A, < 0 then follow from the facts that aa((s -k)lx)ld"(= f ((s -k)lx) > 0 and 
aa ((s -k )Ix )l'()A. = -(1 -f ((s -k )Ix))< 0. Form = k .x there are two conflicting effects; 
sgnA '(s* )('() s* /'()m) > 0, while sgn aa ((s -k )Ix )/'()m < 0. Thus the signs of '()ft (1t)l'() k and '()p (rt)/'()x 
are indeterminate at this level of generality. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting for s0 in equation (5), it is clear that U 1 � U 2; it is never
optimal to take all cases to trial. Comparing U 1 and U 3 gives the following four cases: 
Case 1. For q ;;:: max{A!(y + A), e l(yx (E8 - E;) + e )}, s = s0 is optimal and the payoff is given by 
U1. 
Case 2. For q e [Al(y +A.), e l(yx (E8 - E; ) + e) ], s = s 0 is optimal and the payoff is given by U 3. 
Case 3. For q e [(e + A.[E;x + k])l(y[E8x + k] + A.[E;x + k] + e ), Al(y+ A.)], s = s0 is optimal and
the payoff is given by U 1.
Case4. Forq ;5;min {(e +A.[E;x +k])l()1:E8x +k]+A.[E;x +k]+e),Al(y+A.) }, s  =Ois optimal
and the payoff is given by U 3• 
Actually, when the interval in Case 2 is non-empty, the interval in Case 3 is empty and vice 
versa. This allows the simplification in Proposition 3. 
14 
FOOTNOTES 
*I would like to thank Kim Border and participants in the Caltech Theory Workshop for helpful
comments. The financial support of the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation and the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago are gratefully 
acknowledged. 
1. In a related paper, Grossman and Katz (1983, p. 752) assume the probability of conviction
differs for guilty and innocent defendants, and that these probabilities are common knowledge,
arguing that the prosecutor is constitutionally required to provide to the defendant all of the
state's evidence against him or her, as well as a summary of what is necessary for conviction
(Brady v. Maryland, 1963). By contrast, Alschuler (1968, p. 66) claims that "the discovery
privileges of the defense are highly restricted, and even the limited right of discovery that the
law affords may be frustrated until plea negotiations are concluded. "
2. Reinganum and Wilde (1986) examined the problem of the settlement and litigation of civil
suits using a signalling model. Because this paper also addresses legal bargaining with private
information, it is important to distinguish this paper from the previous one. In that paper, the
plaintiff had private information about the extent of damages suffered, and made a settlement
demand which was either accepted or rejected by the defendant. Aside from the costs of trial,
the interests of the plaintiff and defendant were always opposed, since the amount of the
settlement was a transfer between the parties. The issue of primary interest was how the
likelihood and the amount of the settlement was affected by various litigation cost allocation
systems. In this paper, the prosecutor has private information about the strength of the case, and
the defendant has private information about his or her guilt or innocence. The interests of the
prosecutor and the defendant are not always opposed, since the prosecutor is assumed to suffer
along with innocent defendants. Finally, I ask whether an ex ante restriction on the prosecutor's
discretion in offering plea bargains can improve social welfare. Thus the nature of the private
information, the forms of the objective functions and the questions addressed by the two papers
are quite different, although there are some obvious formal similarities. Previous analyses
which are primarily relevant to the case of civil litigation include Bebchuk (1984), Gould
(1973), Landes (1971), P'ng (1983), Salant (1984), Samuelson (1983) and Shavell (1982).
3. This paper is similar (but not identical) to that of Grossman and Katz (1983) in its treatment of
the prosecutor's (and society's) objective function. They assume that only the defendant has
private information (about his or her guilt or innocence), and show that plea bargaining may be
preferred to a system of trial for all because it serves an insurance and (possibly) a screening
function. Because the private information is one-sided, a single offer is made to all defendants;
thus selective dismissals are not possible. In our model both parties have private information
(which is correlated); thus offers can be individualized and cases can be selectively dismissed.
However, the regime with restricted discretion is quite similar to their model because a single
offer is made to all defendants.
4. One reason to expect both types of defendant to use the same function p (s) is that defense
attorneys are responsible for "decoding " the sentence offer and advising the defendant about its
acceptability. Since the defense attorney is also unaware of the guilt or innocence of his client,
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